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Abstract

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section introduces situation theory, and the following
one outlines the Semantic Web standards we use for representing and reasoning about situations and the information
they contain. There follows a section where we describe
how we represent and reason about situations and their information, drawing on our running example. We then introduce the Demptser-Shafer theory of evidence and apply
it to our running example. The next section outlines how
we might exploit the structure of a constellation of situations involved in an identification in combining evidence in
Dempster-Shafer theory. The penultimate section outlines
another way Dempster-Shafer theory may be applied in situation theory, where a pattern of situations provides the structure for an argument scheme. The last section concludes.

We present a computational framework for identity based on
Barwise and Devlin’s situation theory. We present an example with constellations of situations identifying an individual
to create what we call id-situations, where id-actions are performed, along with supporting situations. We use Semantic
Web standards to represent and reason about the situations in
our example. We show how to represent the strength of the
evidence, within the situations, as a measure of the support
for judgments reached in the id-situation. To measure evidence of an identity from the supporting situations, we use the
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We enhance DempsterShafer theory in two ways to leverage the information available in a constellation of situations. One way exploits the
structure within the situations, and the other way interprets
the information-relationships in terms of argument schemes.

Situation Theory

Introduction

We follow Devlin’s account of situations and information
(Devlin 1995). Information is represented using infons. An
infon is the basic item of information, with the general form
<< R, a1 , ..., an , l, t, i >>, where R is an n-place relation,
a1 , ..., an are objects appropriate for the corresponding argument places of R, l is a location, t is a temporal location,
and i is the polarity, 0 or 1. A polarity of 1 indicates that
the objects are thus related in l at t; 0 indicates otherwise.
Where s is a situation and an infon, s � is a proposition
and may be true or false; if true, s is said to support (
indeed is information available in s).
A real situation is a single entity that is part of reality
and supports an indefinite number of infons, while an abstract situation is a set of infons. An event is essentially a
kind of situation, and an action is a kind of event (involving
an agent). We take situations as they relate to identity (idsituations) to be those that include identity-relevant actions
(id-actions). We use situation theory to be able to represent
id-situations and the situations that support them.
Situation theory arose as part of the development of situation semantics by Barwise and his colleagues (Barwise and
Perry 1981). In situation semantics, one identifies an utterance situation, in which a speech act is performed, and
a described situation, which the speech act is about. Besides supporting information, a situation may carry information about another situation. This is made possible by
constraints. Some such constraints are natural (as in smoke

We here present our computational framework for identity.
State of the art in identity is represented by the Superidentity
project (Creese et al. 2013)(Hodges, Creese, and Goldsmith
2012), which developed a model in identity that connects elements from both the cyber and physical universes. In their
terminology, an element of identity has a type, and a characteristic is a multiset of elements of identity of the same type.
A superidentity is a set of characteristics. Examples of elements of identity include real names and email addresses.
An initial superidentity has a seed identity element and is
enriched by deriving new elements of identity via functions
that transform one or more elements of given types to an element of another type. For example, an email address may
be transformed to usernames on social network sites. The
enriching continues, creating a directed graph that outlines
the provenance of the elements of identity.
It became apparent, however, that the elements of identity and transforms of the Superidentity project do not support the internal structure we require. For an alternative, we
turned to situation theory based on Devlins account (Devlin
1995). When we attribute identity, we want something like
a legal case. Evidence includes provenance of information,
records of how procedures were followed, how information
was communicated, and critical narrative detail. Central to
our account, a version of Dempster-Shafer theory is used for
a quantitative account of the impact of evidence.
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means fire), and some are conventional, such as those constraints by virtue of which a speech act is about a described
situation.

Running Examples
We present a series of situations involved in identifying an
individual by mugshot and by fingerprint. Our running example is shown in Figures 1 and 2 and involves six situations (within clouds), s1 -s6 . The situations on the right of
each figure (s1 and s2 ) are id-situations that are coordinated
in that they result in identifying the same individual (via
their “name,” actually any identifier unique in the context).
Id-situation s1 has an analyst who matches fingerprints on
file with those on a doorknob. Id-situation s2 has the same
analyst matching the face in a group shot to a face in the
mugshot. The fingerprints on file were produced in s3 , and
the fingerprints on the doorknob were produced in s4 . Situation s4 is a (spatiotemporal) part of the situation portrayed in
the ellipse in the portrayal of s5 , where a group of people is
socializing. This situation is in turn part of s5 , where someone takes a picture of the group. In situation s6 , a mugshot
of the person of interest is produced. It is used in s2 to pick
out the person in question in the group photo. We thus have
two id-cases: the fingerprint case, s1 -s3 -s4 , and the mugshot
case, s2 -s4 -s5 .
The dashed lines between situations shown on the left and
id-situations connect things produced (left) and used (right).
In all cases except where the objects produced are themselves used in the id-situation, there are additional copying or rendering situations not shown in in the figures. In
a sense, we have one id-situation made of two coordinated
id-situations.
We use the empty prefix : for the namespace in which
we define the basic classes and properties. An instance s of
class :Situation generally appears as subject in triples identifying the time and location of the situation in terms of subclasses of classes defined in the WGS84 Geo Positioning
vocabulary. We thus do not represent time and spatial location in an infon but rather just assume that all infons in a
given situation share a common time and place. We move
on to using the Semantic Web standards to implement our
running examples as per situation theory.

Figure 1: Fingerprint Situation
are URIs but not vice-versa.)A URI reference (URIref) is itself a URI with an optional fragment identifier at the end.
URIrefs are written typically as qnames, which are in the
form of prefix:lp, where the namespace prefix is a URI.
A blank node (bnode) is a resource that is not identified by
a URIref.
To represent RDF statements in a machine readable way,
the W3C has defined several serializations. One of these serializations is the Notation 3 (N3) serialization. Triples in
the N3 serialization are expressed as each of the three components separated by whitespace. When a subject is shared
amongst triple, we can abbreviate this by having the subject listed once and separated predicate-object pairs by semicolons:
subject predicate1 object1;
predicate2 object2.
RDFS allows for classes and properties to be defined using RDF triples. We state that individual x is an instance
of class C with the triple x rdf:type C. These individuals could be denoted by a URIref or a bnode. N3 allows
“a” to be used as an abbreviation for “rdf:type”. A class
may be a subclasse of other classes, and a property may be
a subproperty of other properties. If p is a subproperty of q,
then x p y implies x q y. If we have x p y, then x is
an instance of the class that is the domain of p, and y is an
instance of its range.
SPARQL is a SQL-like query language for triple stores
where a variable is a sequence of alphanumeric characters
proceeded by ‘?’, a WHERE clause is a sequence of triples
each of which might have a variable for its subject, object,
or both. SPARQL reports only the variables that appear in
the SELECT clause.
SWRL is a rule language for the Semantic Web. SWRL
rules are in the form head → body where head is the
antecedent and body is the consequence.

Semantic Web
The Semantic Web is based on two World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standards: 1) the resource description framework (RDF) and 2) RDF schema (RDFS). These standards
are enhanced by the much more expressive OWL (Web ontology language) standard. RDF is a W3C recommendation
that provides a data model for annotations in the Semantic
Web. An RDF statement (triple) is of the form subject predicate object. RDF allows users to annotate web resources
in terms of named properties. The values of these named
properties can be URIrefs of web resources or literals. Resources that are annotated by RDF are named by uniform
resource identifiers (URIs). A URL is a string that identifies
a resource on the web. A URI has the same structure as a
URL but need not identify a resource on the web. (URLs
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on the doorknob. Situation s3 has one important infon, i3,
an instance of :TakeFpInfon, that a given officer takes
the fingerprint of our suspect.
The photo id-case also involves three situations: s2 (idsituation), s5 (taking the forensic photo), and s6 (taking
the mug shot). s2 is analogous to s1 but lacks the analogue of the fingerprint on the doorknob. s6 is analogous
to s3 (taking the fingerprint on file). s5 is only roughly
analogous to s4. One of s5’s infons, i5, is an instance of
:ForensicPicInfon and is the subject of triples identifying the photographer, the camera, the photo produced, and
the situation, s5a, caught on camera. One infon that s5a
has is that our suspect is touching the doorknob; it also has
sit:s5a :inSituation group:5342;
This says that this group is in the situation but does not identify
any information associated with the group, yet infon i5 includes
the information that s5a is the situation pictured. We also have
(where insys:201 is our suspect)
group:5342 a foaf:Group;
foaf:member insys:201, insys:563.

There is thereby in i5 the information that insys:201
is pictured in the photo produced; we do not necessarily have the information that insys:201 is a member of
group:5342. And we have (where foaf:depicts is
an information relation)

Figure 2: Mugshot Situation

fshot:812 a biom:GroupImage;
# The group photo (s2, s5)
foaf:depicts sit:s5a .

RDF/OWL/SWRL Representation of Examples
That a given situation s has an infon i (an instance of class
:Infon) is expressed as s :hasInfon i. Infon i itself has a polarity (property :hasPolarity). The various relations are captured by various subclasses of :Infon.
If R is a relation with roles r1 , r2 , ..., rn , then we define a
subclass :RInfon of :Infon and properties r1, r2,
..., rn with domain :RInfon. This avoids RDF’s restriction of relations to binary relations (“properties”) since
any instance of :RInfon may be a subject of any number
of triples with one of r1, r2, ..., rn as the property.
The fingerprint id-case involves three situations: s1 (idsituation), s3 (taking the fingerprint on file), s4 (taking the
forensic fingerprint). We discuss only s1 in detail. It has
three important infons: i1, i1a, and i14. Like all our
infons, they have positive polarity; henceforth we assume
this. We discuss only i1 in detail. It is an instance of
:AnalystMatchingFpInfon, information that an analyst is matching the forensic fingerprint and the fingerprint
on file (no suggestion of objective similarity). Three properties are recorded for it: :fpObserved, whose value
is the URIref of the forensic fingerprint, :fpRecorded,
whose value is the URIref of the fingerprint on file, and
:fpAnalyst is for the officer making the match. In N3,
this is (i1, like all our infons, is represented by a bnode.)

There is also a part-whole (mereological) relation between s4 and s5: s4, where the suspect touches the doorknob, is a proper part of s5a, the situation caught on film in
situation s5 .
Assuming all our information is available (possibly distributed) on the Web, we can issue SPARQL queries that
navigate across situations connected by, say, shared individuals.
We have identified a few important infons for each real
situation s1 -s6 , but each supports an unbounded number of
infons. We need abstract situations as types to classify real
situations and constellations in a way conducive to identification. For classifying, we use SWRL rules. Where C is
a class and x is an individual, C(x) is true iff the triple x
rdf:type C holds. Where p is a property, x is a URIref
or bnode, and y is a URIref, a bnode, or a literal, p(x,
y) is true iff the triple x p y holds. If certain conditions
hold of a situation ‘?s’ (note that SWRL variable names
begin with ‘?’), we classify it as some subclass of class
:Situation. Our classifying SWRL rules, then, have the
form
Situation(?s), ... -> SituationSubClass(?s)

The conditions that fill in the ellipsis relate to the infons
that ?s has, one or more sequences like

_:i1 a :AnalystMatchingFpInfon;
:fpAnalyst officer:117;
:fpObserved forensicfp:822;
:fpRecorded fpfile:496;
:hasPolairty :PositivePolarity.

hasInfon(?s, ?i), ...,
hasPolarity(?i, ?po),
polarityValue(?pol, ?val), equal(?val, 1)

Infon i1a is an instance of :SimilarFpInfon, that
the forensic fingerprint and the one on file have a similarity
measure of 0.94 according to a certain procedure. Infon i14
is an instance of :OnInfon, that the forensic fingerprint is

The ellipsis here is filled in with specifics on the roles of
the relation represented by the infon. The sequence of atoms
after the ellipsis forces positive infon polarity. All our infons
have positive polarity, so we ignore this.
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The case-type with the photos involves three situation
types, identified with the classes :Mug (a mug shot is
taken), :Pic (a forensic picture is taken), and :PicId (idsituation type). A situation is of type :Mug if it has an infon of type :TakeMugshotInfon involving a recorded
mugshot, a subject, and an administrative officer responsible for the mugshot. A situation ?s is of type :Pic if it
has a :ForensicPicInfon involving an officer taking
the photo, a group image that is the photo, and a situation
captured by the photo and that includes the group depicted
in the photo. This describes a situation that references another. A :Pic situation, then, is like an utterance situation,
best compared to a situation where the “uttering” is writing,
although speech and writing abstract away information.
The case-type with fingerprints also involves three situation types, identified with the classes :FpFile (a fingerprint is recorded), :Touch (a forensic fingerprint is left),
and :FpId (id-situation type).
Recall that an id-situation together with its supporting situations is an id-case. We form id-case types, abstract versions of id-cases. Generally, an id-case type glues together
several situation types, which requires (for connections) exposing more information in the situations than is exposed for
the situation types. We define SWRL rules to classify cases
as subclasses of a generic :Case class.
In the envisioned scenario, the two id-cases are coordinated since the filed fingerprint and mugshot of a single suspect are used to establish his presence in a gathering. We
introduce symmetric property :coordinatedIdCase
whose domain and range are :IdCase. We have a SWRL
rule for determining that an instance of MugIdCase and an
instance of FingerpIdCase are coordinated by checking
not only that the label on the mugshot is the same as that
on the fingerprint on file but also that we have one and the
same id-situation. The criterion for identity of situations is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Available evidence (e.g., similarity measures) provides
some degree of support (“mass”), from 0.0 to 1.0, for subsets of W ; those subsets with non-zero mass are called focal
elements. The sum of the mass for all subsets of W is 1.0.
Where U ⊆ W , the belief that U holds, Bel(U ), is the sum
of the support (mass) on subsets of U , a number in [0,1].
Where m(.) is the mass function, m(U ) is the probability
of observing U , so the definition of the belief function in
terms of the mass function is Belm (U ) = ∑U ∗ ⊆U m(U ∗ ).
For our example, suppose that the similarity measures for
the singletons {Fred}, {Bill}, {Sue}, and {Mary} to the fingerprint on the doorknob are, respectively, 0.4, 0.075, 0.075,
and 0.0. In addition, there is some evidence, mass 0.05, of
the fingerprint belonging to {Sue, Bill} (i.e., to Sue or Bill
without distinction). And perhaps someone other than the
people mentioned left the fingerprint on the doorknob. The
evidence for this chance has about half the strength as the
evidence for {Fred}; as a singleton set, it receives mass 0.2.
We suppose that there is some interest in whether the person
is either male or female. Since there is no reason to imply the
unknown fingerprint belongs to a male rather than a female
or vice versa, we split this mass between a fictional female,
Nulla, and a fictional male, Nullus. The sum of the masses
so far is 0.8. The remaining 0.2 covers all ways the fingerprint could have got on the doorknob, not only by those
mentioned, but perhaps left before or after the situation considered.
Corresponding to the belief function is the plausibility
function. The plausibility that U holds, P laus(U ), is the
sum of the probabilities of the evidence compatible with the
world being in U : P lausm (U ) = ∑U ∗ s.t.U ∗ ∩U ≠� m(U ∗ ).
For U ⊆ W , Bel(U ) ≤ P laus(U ). Note that, where Ū
is the complement of U , P laus(U ) = 1 − Bel(Ū ) and
Bel(U ) = 1 − P laus(Ū ).
Table 1 shows the values of the Dempster-Shafer functions for each focal element for s1 . All represents the entire
frame of discernment; its mass was not assigned elsewhere.
We show the values of the belief and plausibility functions
only for focal elements; there are other subsets of W that
have non-zero belief and plausibility.

Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
We want a measure of how the evidence supports the judgment in an id-situation. It should reflect the structure of an
id-case and fuse belief constraints from different sources. In
our example, s1 and s2 are essentially a single utterance situation (the identity judgment), and the situation in the photo
in s5 is the described situation. Imagine that, in s1 , the analyst has access to fingerprints for several likely suspects,
each associated with a supporting situation in which a fingerprint was recorded. The RDF for s1 includes a measure of
how similar the fingerprint on file is to the fingerprint from
the scene; in the expanded view, it includes such measures
for all available fingerprints.
We adapt the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
(Halpern 2003). The frame of discernment (the set of possible values), W , includes here people who might have left
the fingerprint or have their mugshot considered. In s1 , we
have a measure of how well the fingerprint on file matches
the fingerprint on the scene. We also have similarity measures for other people who might have left the fingerprint on
the door in Figure 1, say, Fred, Bill, Sue, and Mary.

Focal element
{Fred}
All
{Sue}
{Mary}
{Bill}
{Nullus}
{Bill,Sue}
{Nulla}

Mass
0.400
0.200
0.075
0.000
0.075
0.100
0.050
0.100

Belief
0.400
1.000
0.075
0.000
0.075
0.100
0.200
0.100

Plausibility
0.600
1.000
0.325
0.200
0.325
0.300
0.400
0.300

Table 1: Fingerprint Mass, Belief, and Plausibility
For s2 , focal elements are subsets of W with non-zero
probability of containing the person whose mugshot matches
the picture of the culprit in the forensic picture. Suppose
that the mass for the focal elements are Fred: 0.35; All:
0.2; {Sue}: 0.0; {Mary}: 0.05; {Bill}: 0.05; {Mary,Nulla}:
0.15; {Nullus}: 0.100; and {Nulla}: 0.100. Given mass
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functions m1 (e.g., for the fingerprints) and m2 (e.g., for
the mugshots) defined on some frame W , we use Dempster’s Rule of Combination to construct a new mass function m1 ⊕ m2 that fuses the belief constraints of m1 and m2
(e.g., combining the evidence from both the fingerprints and
mugshots):

adding information relevant to the acceptability of the fingerprint file. This might reduce the belief due to matching
the fingerprint. Instead of something like Mary as a frame
element, we have things like (Mary, off23, 11/25/2007) for
a fingerprint purportedly of Mary; the frame is effectively
a product space, Suspects × AdministeringOf f icers ×
Dates. We effectively expand the id-situation to include the
supporting situations.
Issues arise with respect to the structure of this product
space and how the mass is aggregated to contribute to evidence in the id-situation (where a judgment is made). A
focal element is a subset of this product space that is assigned a non-zero mass. We can consider something like
marginal distributions: for a given (suspect, administeringofficer) pair, we add up the mass across all the dates for that
pair. Going further, for a given suspect, we add up all the
mass for the triples that involve that suspect.
The certainty on the constraint from the fingerprintproducing situation to the existence of the fingerprint file in
the id-situation is a measure of the general acceptability of
introducing a fingerprint file into an investigation. What the
mass of the supporting situation is taken to be depends on
how the evidence is being used. If the investigation engenders suspicion of a given administering officer, then, within
the supporting situation, the mass for identifying the suspect
would be reduced. These considerations revolve around the
relation between the id-situation and a supporting situation
as well as the nature of the supporting situation. These are
essentially ontological considerations.

(m1 ⊕ m2 )(h) = ∑U1 ,U2 s.t.U1 ∩U2 =U m1 (U )m2 (U )�c

where normalizing constant c is the sum of the products
m1 (U1 ) ⊕ m2 (U2 ) of all overlapping pairs U1 , U2 :

c = ∑U1 ,U2 s.t.U1 ∩U2 ≠� m1 (U1 )m2 (U2 )
Table 2 shows the shows the values of the Dempster-Shafer
functions for each focal element of m1 ⊕ m2 .
Focal element
{Fred}
All
{Sue}
{Mary}
{Bill}
{Mary,Nulla}
{Nullus}
{Bill,Sue}
{Nulla}

Mass
0.536
0.074
0.028
0.018
0.058
0.055
0.092
0.018
0.120

Belief
0.536
1.000
0.028
0.018
0.058
0.194
0.092
0.104
0.120
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Plausibility
0.610
1.000
0.120
0.148
0.150
0.268
0.166
0.178
0.249

Table 2: Combined for fingerprint and mugshot

Dempster-Shafer Theory & Situation Theory

Dempster-Shafer Argument Schemes

To reflect the structure of an id-case in our account of evidence, we consider the work by Lalmas et al. (Lalmas and
Van Rijsbergen 1994), who combine situation theory and
Dempster-Shafer theory for an account of information retrieval. They consider constraints as conditionals, → ,
where
and
are types, with a measure of certainty,
cert( → ). If cert( → ) < 1, then
→ leads
from one situation s (say, where there is smoke) to another,
s′ (where there is fire), which may be just an extension of
s in that it supports all the infons supported by s. They
require that, for type , where C is the set of constraints,
∑ → ∈C cert( → ) = 1
One of our constraints is that there must be an appropriate
supporting situation in which the fingerprint file was produced. We read this, as it were, backwards or teleologically:
if there is a situation in which a fingerprint file is produced,
then there is a situation in which it is used. Our frame of
discernment W is a finite number of fingerprint files. The
masses in the singletons are now on the constraints (or sets
of constraints). Where → leads from situation s to s′ ,
Lalmas et al. define the mass of s′ in terms of the mass of s
and the certainty of → : mi+1 (s′ ) = cert( → )mi (s).
s′ itself may actually be a set of alternative situations the
sum of whose masses equals cert( → )mi (s). So we
invoke the notion of a frame of discernment W ′ being the
refinement of a frame W ; essentially W ′ is a finer partition
of the universe of possibilities than W .
When we impose a constraint that leads from a
fingerprint-producing situation, the frame is refined by

How evidence regarding supporting situations is incorporated into an overall evaluation can perhaps be answered in
a nonontological manner following the work by Tang et al.
in combining argumentation with an explicit representation
of evidence (Tang et al. 2013) (see also (Tang et al. 2012)).
They introduce a logical language L with the usual truthfunctional connectives. Atomic propositions are constructed
from a finite set of predicate symbols and a finite set of individual constants, with no function symbols, so there are only
finitely many possible ground terms. Individual variables
occur only in rules (for generality, with uniform substitution
across premises and conclusion). The frame of discernment,
, is the set of possible truth assignments to all the (ground)
atomic propositions: if there are n such propositions, there
are 2n elements of ( i.e., rows in the truth table). The interpretation of proposition (atomic or not), I( ), is a subset of . Propositions , ∈ L are logically equivalent iff
I( ) = I( ). Where true and f alse are the obvious constants, I(true) = and I(f alse) = �. An inference rule
for L is of the form:
=

p1 ,...,pm
c

where p1 , ..., pm ; c ∈ L. The pi are the set of premises of the
rule, and c is its conclusion.
It is straightforward to go from a frame of discernment where elements are structures on individuals to a
frame of discernment where elements are logical propositions over a finite set of predicate symbols. To take
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our example (M ary, of f 23, 11�25�2007) ∈ Suspects ×
AdministeringOf f icers × Dates, assume we have oneplace predicates suspect(x), adminOf f icer(x), and
date(x), meaning, respectively, that x is the suspect
(whose fingerprint is taken), that x is the administrating officer, and that x is the date (when the fingerprint was taken). Assume also that we have individual
constants Mary, off23, and 11/25/2007 with the obvious
denotations. Then our example triple translates to the
conjunction suspect(M ary) ∧ adminOf f icer(of f 23) ∧
date(11�25�2007). Set-theoretical operators correspond in
obvious ways to truth-functional operators, which again relate to set-theoretical operators on the interpretations of
propositions.
We have a set of formulae �h, E� where �h, E� is an
evidence argument that has h ∈ L associated with supporting evidence E for which there is a mass function, E = {e1 ∶
m1 , ..., en ∶ mn } such that ∑ni=0 mi = 1.0. (Note that here
a mass function is being associated with a single proposition.) To write a mass function value in isolation, we write
m(E, ei ) . Given evidence argument �h, e�, the belief b(h),
disbelief d(h), and uncertainty u(h) of h are defined as
• b(h) = ∑I(ei )⊆I(h) m(E, ei ) = the sum of the mass of all
the focal elements in E that are part of the evidence for h.
• d(h) = ∑I(ei )∩I(h)=� m(E, ei ) = the sum of all the mass
for all the focal elements that are evidence for ¬h.
• u(h) = 1 − b(h) − d(h) = the sum of the mass of the
formulae that imply neither h nor ¬h.
We can define the plausibility of h as 1 − d(h). We also
have a set of rules { , E} where rule is associated with
evidence E.
For an example of the use of a rule, suppose that
the proposition in question is that the fingerprint is
Bill’s, f print(Bill), and suppose that the associated evidence is as follows (which duplicates the mass function used in the example in the above example) E1 =
{f print(F red) ∶ 0.4, f print(Sue) ∶ 0.075, f print(Bill) ∶
0.075, f print(N ullus) ∶ 0.1, f print(N ulla) ∶ 0.1,
f print(Bill) ∨ f print(Sue) ∶ 0.05, f print(All) ∶ 0.2}
Suppose also that we have the following rule with evidence
E5 = {f print(X) ∧ thief (X) ∶ 0.8, f print(X) ∧
¬thief (X) ∶ 0.2}
Note that the proposition constituting the premise is carried
down to be conjoined with the stated conclusion; this is to
specialize the conclusion to the individual to which variable
X is bound.
It is more informative to combine the evidence E1 as a
whole and the evidence E5 , where we take products, instantiating X to the individual constant in the corresponding element of E1 (treating f print(Bill)f print(Sue)
as f print(Bill � Sue), where Bill � Sue is a composite object). The result is shown in Table 3, where
a number in a cell is the mass value of f print(X) ∧
thief (X) or f print(X) ∧ ¬thief (X), depending on the
row, where the value of X is indicated in the column.
Note that the sum of all values is 1.0.
We have, for
example Bel(f print(Bill) ∧ thief (Bill)) = 0.06 and
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Thief?

Person
Yes
No

Fred
0.32
0.08

Thief?

Person
Yes
No

Nullus
0.08
0.02

Bill
0.06
0.015

Sue
0.06
0.015

Bill or Sue
0.04
0.01

Nulla
0.08
0.04
All
0.16
0.04

Table 3: Result of Applying our Rule with evidence E5
P laus(f print(Bill) ∧ thief (Bill)) = 0.26. This example
is particularly simple, and we intentionally avoided combining evidence to indicate how the rules are applied.
Tang et al. (Tang et al. 2013) consider the several ways of
combining evidence that have been suggested in the context
of Dempster-Shafer theory, considering them all to fit into
the general pattern of:

� A rule pattern in

:

=

p1 ,...,pm
c

� A Dempster-Shafer argument scheme specifying

� the pattern of the evidence of the premises:
�h1 , E1 �...�hn , En �
� optional evidence for rule applicability E
� an an associated conclusion evidence derivation process: we compute the evidence for the conclusion from
the evidence for the premises possibly including the
rule evidence

When we go to apply an argument scheme, we ask certain
critical questions. Only if the answers to all these questions
are affirmative are we entitle to apply the scheme. Each
scheme is associated with a particular rule for combining
evidence. We have seen the oldest and most common rule:
Dempster’s rule. Another common rule is Yager’s rule (see
(Curley 2007) for an intuitive comparison with Dempster’s
rule), which treats conflicting evidence as uncertainty. See
(Sentz and Ferson 2002) for a systematic presentation of various rules for combining evidence.
What we are interested in, however, is how to go from information produced in supporting situations to its use as evidence in an id-situation. (In contrast, the rule above, without combination, used the results of id-actions as evidence
for various actors being thieves.) This is usually a combination problem. A closer look, however, reveals that the language used in supporting situation s3 is different from the
language used in the id-situation, s1 . One way they differ is
that s1 is an utterance situation while s3 is a described situation. In terms of vocabulary, s3 talks about an administering
officer, the time and place the fingerprint is taken, and the
method used. And s1 talks about the fingerprint from the
scene, matching the two fingerprints, and the time and place
the matching is done. Both situations talk about the fingerprint produced in s3 and used in s1 and the person thereby
identified. Considering the questions Tang et al. pose, the
appropriate rule here is Zhang’s center combination rule,
which is based on two frames of discernment S and T from
two disjoint sublanguage LS and LT of L. It assumes that
we are concerned with the truth of sentences in LT but we
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only have evidence expressed in LS and in LS ∈ LT . For
AT ∪ LT , we are given two pieces of evidence, E1 in LS
and E2 in LS ∪ LT . This scheme can be used where question 1 for Demster’s rule is answered “no” since the evidence
does not directly support the conclusion of interest because
of the change in language. Zhang’s rule is especially useful
in transforming the evidence from a source domain LS into
a targeting domain LT with the connection evidence in their
super domain LS ∪ LT .
There is, however, more than combining evidence going
on as information supported by s3 is taken as evidence in s1 .
How this fitting into a forensic picture contributes to the resulting mass function must be captured by the rule ∈ that
is applied. This plays a role similar to that of a constraint,
→ , along with its level of certainty, in the application of
Dempster-Shafer theory to situations.

pp. 81–87

work, then, besides including enhancements to the implementation, will attempt to reconcile these two approaches to
how supporting situations contribute to the evidence for a
judgment.
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Conclusion
We have presented a computational framework for identity
based on situation theory, where we identify id-cases, each
consisting of an id-situation (where an identity judgment is
made) and supporting situations. We have shown how to encode in RDF information supported by a situation in terms
of infons (items of information). We have shown how to use
OWL and SWRL to define rules that classify situations thus
encoded under types (i.e., abstract situations). We have also
defined SWRL rules for identifying types of id-cases and
coordinated id-cases. We also address quantifying the evidence that supports the judgment in an id-situation. For this,
we use the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, applying it
to our running example. To capture how supporting situations contribute to the evidence for a judgment, we considered two approaches. One approach associates a certainty
with a constraint by virtue of which one situation carries
information about another, and it introduces a refinement
of the frame of discernment related to the target situation.
The second approach sees the support that situations provide
for the id-situation in the framework of argument schemes
framed in terms of Dempster-Shafer theory.
Following the argument-schemes approach, we wish to
approximate the outcomes of informal reasoning and largely
capture the post hoc rationalizations by which actors justify their decisions. The classic here is Toulmin’s The Uses
of Argument (Toulmin 1958), which presents a diagram for
directing one’s analysis of arguments. The subject is sometimes known as informal logic. There is a coherent literature
under the rubric “argumentation theory” (cf., e.g., (Walton
2013)(Van Eemeren et al. 1996)). Argumentation is central
to the law, and legal scholars have addressed evidence in
this context (Twining 2006) (Anderson, Schum, and Twining 2005). Note that a legal perspective may be central to
ones view of individuals and numerical identity: Locke famously called “person” a forensic term (and held personal
identity, or self, to be founded on continuity of consciousness not of some [unknowable] substance) (Locke 1689).
On the other hand, capturing the constraints and refining
the frame of discernment would have the benefit of associating evidence with the inherent structure of the case. Future
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